Supreme Court Cases: World War II

By a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in the Gobitis case. The Court ruled that the West Virginia Board’s policy was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech, rather than its guarantee of free exercise of religion. In what is regarded as one of the truly great, passionate opinions in Supreme Court history, Justice Robert Jackson wrote for the majority: “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials… Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. … If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”
By a 6-P vote, the Supreme Court ruled that the President’s action was a constitutional exercise of government power during a time of “emergency and peril” for the nation. Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black explained that the internments had “a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage.” He went on to explain that the government needed to act quickly in wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Black wrote: “There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short.”
One of the dissenting justices wrote that he dissented “from this legalization of racism” and went on to assert that racial discrimination “is unattractive in any setting but it is utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United States.”
By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court held that New Jersey’s reimbursement to parents of parochial and private school students for the costs of busing their children to school was constitutional because the assistance went to the child, not the church. This became known as the “child benefit theory.” The majority reasoned that as long as the child or his parents were the beneficiaries, and not the church itself, the reimbursement was constitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black made clear that the First Amendment’s no establishment of religion clause now applied to the actions of state governments through the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the doctrine of incorporation. Black continued by writing: “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State. …The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here.”